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ABSTRACT 
 
Elite Capture, Political Voice and Exclusion from Aid: 
An Experimental Study*
 
We experimentally study the influence of local information conditions on elite capture and 
social exclusion in community-based development schemes with heterogeneous groups. Not 
only information on the distribution of aid resources through community-based schemes, but 
also information on who makes use of an available punishment mechanism through majority 
voting may be important. The main results are the following. First, many rich community 
representatives try to satisfy a political majority who would then abstain from using the 
punishment mechanism, and exclude those community members whose approval is then not 
required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with private information on the 
distribution and public voting. Second, when voting is public, responders are more reluctant 
to make use of the punishment mechanism, and representatives who follow the exclusion 
strategy are more inclined to exclude the poorest responder. Third, punishment is largely 
ineffective as it induces rich representatives to capture all economic resources. Fourth, if a 
poor agent takes the representative’s role, punishment rates drop, efficiency increases, and 
final distributions become more equal. 
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21. Introduction
An increasing number of government and non-government aid programs follow a community-based
development approach. According to conservative calculations, the World Bank’s portfolio of projects
that follow such an approach has increased from $325 million in 1996 to $2 billion in 2003 (Mansuri
and Rao, 2004). In practice, this approach amounts to giving community representatives a formal
mandate to distribute aid resources among the community members. This has several advantages. In
comparison with the officers of aid programs, local representatives tend to have better access to local
information, which might increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the program.
It is, however, not evident that these representatives – generally among the better-off community
members (Bierschenk et al. 2000; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Mansuri and Rao, 2004) – have similar
interests  as  the  aid  donors,  mainly  concerned  with  the  fate  of  the  poorest.  In  comparison  with  aid
donors, these representatives are not necessarily driven by ‘social preferences’ but also by individual
profit motives. The advantages of delegating distribution tasks to local representatives may therefore
be jeopardized by increasing elite capture and social exclusion (Alderman, 2001; Galasso and
Ravallion, 2001; Conning and Kevane, 2002; Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Platteau and Gaspart,
2003; Mansuri and Rao, 2004). At the same time, however, potential beneficiaries are not passive
agents. Very often they have the ability to influence the distributive decision of the representative by
making use of political voice and control mechanisms. These mechanisms1, however, do not
automatically enable community members to make representatives accountable to them. The following
elements are important to consider.
First, it may be a deliberate strategy of representatives to undermine any political coalition that
obliges them to retain fewer resources. They can do so by satisfying a political majority who would
then abstain from using the political voice and control mechanism, while excluding those community
members whose approval is then not required. Exclusion may thus be implied by a representative’s
profit seeking.
Second, the effectiveness of political voice and control mechanisms might depend on the
information flows among community members. Conning and Kevane (2002) in their review of
community-based targeting schemes emphasize that a community’s ability to mobilize information
could influence opportunities for capture by elites. Similarly, Abraham and Platteau (2004) argue that
rural  elites  in  African  communities  are  often  able  to  benefit  themselves  because  of  poor  flows  of
information.
1 The availability of these mechanisms should not be taken for granted. In traditional African societies, for
instance, decisions tend to be made through consensus-seeking, which makes it practically impossible for
individual community agents to oppose the elite. Majority voting procedures to challenge community
representatives and more so if voting is secret, are not accepted. To the extent that these close-knit societies
become increasingly integrated in markets, leading to expanding opportunities and socio-economic
differentiation, community members acquire more freedom to disagree with the ruling elite (Platteau and
Abraham, 2002). This characterizes the current situation of most Latin American and Asian communities. In
these societies, political voice and control mechanisms tend to be readily available.
3Two types of information are particularly important. Access to information on the distribution of
the aid resources might influence community members’ use of political control mechanisms.
Information on who disagrees with the proposed distribution and makes use of the political control
institution might also matter. If the latter information is made public (e.g. through a quick hand raising
procedure instead of an anonymous voting procedure), community members may take this into
account when making their decisions. In particular, it is plausible that, in a repeated setting,
community members who express dissatisfaction may receive less from the representative and thus
eventually become worse-off in comparison with those who remain silent. Responders who disagree
with the distribution may anticipate this and therefore refrain from expressing dissatisfaction if voting
is public.
To examine the influence of these information conditions on elite capture and social exclusion by
the representative, and the voice of community members as potential beneficiaries of these resources,
we organized a laboratory experiment. Experimental methods are increasingly used in development
economics (Cason and Khan, 1999; Cardenas, 2003; Karlan, 2005; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008) and
they are particularly useful to study behavioral dimensions at work when distributive decisions are
made. Moreover, different institutions can be created in a controlled way, so that the influence of
diverse institutional arrangements on individual behavior can be studied; something which is very
difficult or impossible in an uncontrolled real-life environment (Ostrom, 1998: 17). A strong
advantage of conducting laboratory experiments relates to the control of the data gathering process.
Information is acquired in a systematic way, so that noise is minimized, and more complex
experiments can be conducted (e.g. repeated play, multiple participants, etc.). Some disadvantages,
however, remain which will be addressed in the discussion section.
In our experiment, a permanent representative, being the richest of an economically
heterogeneous group, is asked to distribute a fixed amount of resources among the group members in
subsequent rounds2. After each distribution decision, the other members have the possibility to punish
the representative, but only if a majority of them votes in favor of doing so. To look at the influence of
information about the distribution decisions made by the representative we compare a situation with
public information on the complete distribution of the resources with a situation where the responders
only know their individual share. To study the importance of information on the voting decisions, we
compare a situation with secret voting with a situation where both the representative and the
responders obtain complete information on the individual voting decisions.
The experimental results show that many representatives try to satisfy a political majority who
would then abstain from voting in favor of punishment, while they exclude those community members
whose approval is then not required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with private
2 Note the following two assumptions. First, it is the richest player who acts as representative. We justify this
by the observation that most community representatives tend to be among the better-off. Second, the
representative cannot be replaced. In most communities the local ‘elite’ although contested remains firmly in
power.
4information on the distribution and public voting. When voting is public, responders are more
reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism, whereas representatives become aware that
poorer responders are less reluctant to protest, so that these poorer responders are more likely
excluded. Moreover, it is shown that punishment is ineffective in reducing elite capture or exclusion
as, instead of enforcing representatives to reduce their share, it induces them to capture all economic
resources in revenge. Finally, it is observed that if a poor agent takes the representative’s role,
punishment rates drop and final distributions become substantially more equal.
2. Experimental design
In this section, we describe the distribution game that we implemented in the laboratory. Its key
elements are a multi-person distribution (dictator) game followed by a voting stage for punishment.
We identify equilibria of the voting subgame under standard and social preferences and the resulting
optimal strategies of the representative. Subsequently, we describe the procedures of the experiment,
the parameters used in the experiment, and the treatment conditions.
2.1. A non-cooperative distribution game with voting for punishment
There are four players, labeled A, B, C and D, where player A assumes the role of representative. Each
player has some endowment Ei, which can be interpreted as the players’ wealth. Importantly, the
endowments are unequally distributed among the players. The representative, A, is assumed to be the
richest, followed by the two responders B and C; responder D is the poorest of all players (i.e. EA > EB
= EC > ED). The game proceeds as follows:
Stage 1: The representative, player A, distributes a fixed amount of resources M among a group of
four players, him/herself included, such that M=x+x+x+x DCBA , where ix  indicates the share of
player i.
Stage  2: The responders are informed about the distribution and simultaneously place a vote
whether to punish the representative or not, that is each responder places a yes, y, or no, n, vote.
The (material) pay-offs of the players are determined in the following way. If less than two responders
vote in favor of punishment everybody earns the amount according to the proposed distribution by the
representative. On the other hand, if a majority of responders votes in favor of punishment the
representative’s payoff will be reduced by an amount K and each responder’s pay-off will be reduced
by an amount k, where K is assumed to be much larger than k.
The voting stage adds an important political-economic element to the distribution game. It can be
interpreted as a control and punishment procedure implemented by the aid donor but also as a political
instrument established endogenously in the community. We assume that such an institution already
5exists and investigate how important institutional details can affect a representative’s distribution
decision. In particular, we are interested in exclusionary practices by the representative. For this
reason, there are three responders because then it is possible to exclude one responder when only a
simple majority is needed in order to avoid punishment.
Our game bears some resemblance to two frequently studied games: the dictator game (e.g.,
Hoffman et al. 1994) and the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982). In the latter game, one player (the
proposer) has to propose how to share a fixed amount of money with one responder. The responder
can accept or reject the proposal, where upon rejection both players earn nothing. Experimental results
typically are that the mean of the proposals is around 40% of the available amount and the mode is the
equal split. At the same time, most offers of less than 20% are rejected by the responder (Camerer and
Thaler, 1995; Henrich et al., 2004).3 Comparing these results with proposals made in dictator game
experiments where the responder can only accept, distributors give more to the responder when the
latter can punish by rejection (Hoffman et al., 1994).4
Our game differs in several aspects from the ultimatum and dictator game. First, the
representative faces multiple responders that differ in economic wealth; second, punishment is not an
individual decision but needs agreement via a political mechanism; third, in contrast to the ultimatum
game the effect and cost of punishment are fixed.
In the following, we discuss theoretical predictions of our distribution game. We first characterize
the pure strategy equilibria of the voting subgame assuming (common knowledge of) narrow material
self-interest. Generally, since punishment is costly each responder prefers that the representative is not
punished. However, whether the representative is punished or not also depends on the other
responders’ voting decision. When two other responders vote in favor of punishment, the third
responder cannot change the voting outcome and is therefore indifferent between voting in favor or
against punishment. If the third responder votes in favor of punishment, we obtain the strategy
combination ( )yy,y, , which is an equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies as any unilateral deviation
leaves payoffs unchanged. However, if the third responder votes against punishment each of the other
two responders can make himself better off by also voting against punishment. Consequently, a voting
outcome with exactly two responders voting in favor of punishment cannot be an equilibrium. When
no or exactly one responder votes in favor of punishment, the representative is not punished and no
responder can make himself better off by a unilateral deviation. Therefore, the strategy
3 Assuming standard narrow selfish preferences and common knowledge of rationality, theory predicts that
responders accept any positive amount and that proposers – anticipating this – offer the smallest possible
positive amount. The actually observed behavior can be rationalized with recent models of inequity aversion
(e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and reciprocal fairness (e.g., Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006).
4 The ultimatum game is also studied under a variety of extensions. The following are particularly interesting
as they bear some resemblance to our distribution game. First, repeated pay with fixed partners (e.g.
Slembeck, 1999) adds reputation considerations and tends to reduce the relative importance of fairness
concerns. Second, in case of multiple responders, social comparison between responders becomes possible
(Knez and Camerer, 1995; Riedl and Vyrastekova, 2004).
6combinations, ( )nn,y, , ( )ny,n, , ( )yn,n, , ( )nn,n,  are also equilibria. It is worthwhile to note that the allocation
decision of the representative is undetermined in equilibrium because any allocation of M is
sustainable as an equilibrium.5
In contrast to standard preferences where punishment reduces the utility of each player, with
social preferences (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) this can be different, as
the responders’ utility is influenced by social comparison with the representative. In the following, we
assume that players have Fehr-Schmidt social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). First note that
due to the majority voting rule, ( )yy,y,  and ( )nn,n,  remain  equilibria.  If  all  responders  take  the  same
voting decision, no responder can change the outcome and hence, not increase his utility by changing
his voting decision. For the other strategy combinations, ( )nn,y, , ( )ny,n, , ( )yn,n, , which are equilibria with
standard preferences we study under what conditions they are not longer equilibria with social
preferences. For this to be the case, it is sufficient that at least two responders are better off when the
representative is punished. In Proposition 1 (Appendix 2) we show that this is the case if the proposed
allocation is sufficiently unequal and/or responders have a relatively strong aversion against
disadvantageous inequality.
Due to the multiplicity of equilibria the representative’s optimal strategy strongly depends on his
beliefs about what equilibrium will be played. If the representative believes that the punishment
outcome is independent from his/her distribution decision (e.g. because he/she expects that the
responders will play ( )yy,y,  or ( )nn,n, ), then the distribution game reduces to a dictator game. In Lemma
1 (Appendix 2) it is shown that the representative will follow the ‘exclude-all’-strategy (i.e., keep all
resources), if his aversion against advantageous inequality is not too strong. Otherwise, he will
distribute the resources such that the final income of all players is equalized6.
If the representative believes that the punishment outcome is dependent on his distribution
decision, he may want to avoid punishment. Proposition 2 (Appendix 2) identifies the representative’s
optimal strategy in this case. If the representative’s aversion against advantageous inequality is very
strong (i.e., guilt parameter is larger than ¾) then the optimal strategy is to equalize the final incomes
of all players. In this case, all responders prefer the non-punishment outcome and equalizing income
makes it likely that punishment is actually avoided. With a guilt parameter lower than ¾, the ‘exclude-
all’-strategy is optimal if this strategy and any alternative strategy lead to the same punishment
outcome. Proposition 2 identifies the conditions under which the ‘exclude-one’-strategy can be
optimal. For this strategy to be preferred to the ‘exclude-all’-strategy it must hold that only the latter
5 To see this, consider an arbitrary allocation ( )DCBDCB xxxxxxM ,,,---  and voting strategies where all three
responders vote against punishment when the allocation ( )DCBDCB xxxxxxM ,,,--- is offered and for
punishment in any other case. Any unilateral deviation of the responders does not change the outcome, and
hence the proposed voting strategies are equilibrium strategies in the voting subgame for any offered
allocation. If the representative deviates and proposes an allocation different from ( )DCBDCB xxxxxxM ,,,---
he will be punished and loose K. Hence, it is strictly better not to deviate.
6 The latter is the case when the guilt parameter in the Fehr-Schmidt model is larger than ¾, which is rarely
observed (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
7strategy implies punishment. The ‘exclude-one’-strategy may enable the representative to avoid
punishment when it gives two responders a sufficiently high share such that they prefer non-
punishment. As the representative only needs two responders to abstain from voting for punishment to
avoid punishment, he may increase his income by excluding the third responder. Profit-seeking
representatives that follow the ‘exclude-one’-strategy may look for responders that are satisfied with
lower shares of the pie. In case of endowment inequality among the responders, it may therefore be an
optimal strategy to exclude the poorest responder who may need more compensation in order to vote
against punishment (see also Abbink and Ellman, 2005, for a reasoning along this line).
Due to the multiplicity of equilibria all discussed theoretical models give only limited guidance
for what actual behavior we should expect. The models are also largely silent about the effects of
changing institutional arrangements as information about the distribution decision and public versus
secret voting procedures. It is, however, precisely these institutional arrangements we are interested in.
Another shortcoming of the outcome-based models is that they do not satisfactorily take into account
the possibility of responders being conditional cooperators in voting (Fischbacher et al., 2001;
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006). They may be more likely to vote in favor of punishment the more
responders they believe will do as well. This would make ( )yy,y,  a likely outcome. Since this strategy
combination is also an equilibrium with standard and social preferences, empirical observation of this
strategy combination alone does not tell us anything about its behavioral foundations. For this, we
need to test for a correlation between a responder’s propensity to vote in favor of punishment and his
beliefs that the two other responders will do as well. The experiment we present below will give us
answers to at least some of these questions.
2.2. Experimental procedures and parameters
At the beginning of an experimental session, participants are informed that the experiment consists of
two independent parts and that the instructions for each part will be given after the previous part has
been finished. In both parts, participants are matched in groups of four, which remain unchanged
throughout both parts. In each part, participants play the previously described game for 10 subsequent
rounds. At the beginning of each round, all players receive a fixed endowment. To induce economic
inequality players receive different endowments. Person A receives 200 ‘francs’ (high-endowment),
players B and C receive 150 each (middle-endowment) and player D receives 100 (low-endowment).
These player roles remain unchanged throughout both parts of the experiment.7
In each round of the first part of the experiment, the high-endowment player, who can be thought
of being a permanent representative, is asked to distribute an additional (publicly known) 200 francs
between all members. In the second part, the low-endowment player assumes this role. After each
7 Inequality is introduced before the start of the first round in a purely arbitrary way. The endowment each
player receives at the beginning of each round is publicly known. The accumulated earnings of each
participant are private knowledge throughout the experiment.
8distribution decision of the representative, responders are asked for their satisfaction (on a 9-point
Likert scale) about their share received. Thereafter, they decide about placing a vote in favor or against
punishing the representative. In case of punishment, the pay-off of the representative is reduced with
200 ‘francs’8, whereas the cost of punishment is only 20 ‘francs’ for each of the responders.
After each decision, participants are asked for their beliefs about the voting decisions of the
responders. Each responder is asked for the likelihood that exactly two, one or none other responders
vote in favor of punishment; and the representative is asked for the likelihood that the specific
responders vote in favor of punishment. To induce sincere estimates we used the ‘quadratic scoring
rule’ for belief elicitation (see e.g. Offerman, 1997).9
We are interested in the effects of information about the distribution decision and the voting
decision. Both conditions are particularly interesting because they are altered relatively easily by an
aid donor10 and have potentially important effects on the distribution and voting decisions. If
information about the distribution remains private among the responders, social comparison processes
are severely limited. Only when the distribution decision of the representative is fully disclosed, social
comparison can enter the subsequent voting decisions. Representatives may anticipate that responders
engage in social comparison and therefore adapt their distribution decisions. In particular, we expect
that a strategy of excluding one responder is adopted less often when there is full information about
the distribution decision.
Voting can be organized in a secret or public way. In repeated interactions, this difference can be
crucial for the voting decisions of responders and in consequence for the distribution decision of the
representative. If multiple responders vote publicly, the representative obtains information about the
acceptance thresholds of the responders. Income maximizing representatives may use this information
8 Note that this is exactly the same amount as the resources to be distributed. Consequently, keeping all
resources but being punished results in a status-quo for the representative. Compared with this benchmark,
representatives have a strong incentive to try to avoid punishment by giving more resources to the others, as
this could lead to positive net earnings. If they fail to avoid punishment, however, not keeping all resources
leads to negative net earnings.
9 In brief, the amount subjects earn with these estimates depends on the reported likelihood estimates and the
actual voting decisions of the other members. The additional earnings for a responder are equal to
( ) ( ) ( )( )22212036p3 p+p+p+ j -  if j responders vote in favor of punishment (with j = 0,1,2). pj = Pj/100, with the
reported percentages Pj representing the percentage that j responders vote in favor of punishment. The
additional earnings for the representative are ( ) ( )( )[ ]å -
3
222p1
i
noyesj p+p+ ,  with  pj =  Pj/100. The reported
percentages Pj (j = yes, no) represent the probability that a specific responder votes in favor of punishment.
Consequently, both the representative and the responders can earn an additional earning of maximum 6
‘francs’ in case their likelihood estimates are completely correct. The participants got to see the formulas in
the instructions, but they were told that it was not important to understand them exactly and it was sufficient
that they realized that their expected earnings were maximized if they indicated their true likelihood
estimates.
10 Although aid programs transfer distributive decision power to local representatives, they do not completely
give up their agency. As providers of the aid resources, they are able to influence some rules of the game,
related  to  information  access  on  the  distribution  of  the  resources  and  on  the  use  of  the  political  control
institution by the community members.
9to shift resources away from those agents that are more difficult to satisfy. Such an exclusion-strategy
allows them to increase their personal share while remaining unpunished. Responders who disagree
with the current distribution may anticipate this and, therefore, refrain from voting in favor of
punishment. We, therefore, expect relatively less punishment and higher earnings for representatives
when voting is public in comparison to when it is secret.
In total we organized four different treatments (Table 1) combining private and common
information about the representative’s distribution decision with secret and public voting about
punishment.
Table 1. Treatments and number of groups
Secret voting Public voting
Private information on the distribution 8 groups 8 groups
Common information on the distribution 7 groups 8 groups
The experiment was completely computerized using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and
conducted in the computer lab of Maastricht University in the second half of 2006. In total 124
students participated in 31 groups. 52.4% of the participants were male and average age was 21.8 with
a minimum of 18 and maximum of 31. None of the students had participated in a similar experiment
before. Each session took between 90 and 120 minutes, and average earnings were Euro 22.20, with
the highest earnings being Euro 31.70 and lowest Euro 10.70. Detailed experimental procedures and
the instructions can be found in Appendix 1.
3. Empirical results
In this section, we look at the representatives’ distribution decisions and the responders’ voting
decisions, and how they interact with each other and with the different information conditions. We
first examine the determinants of the responders’ voting decisions, followed by the strategies of the
representatives.
3.1. Responders’ voting behavior
An obvious candidate for explaining voting behavior is the received money share from the
representative. However, to account for possible social comparisons and emotional factors we do not
use the money share itself as an explanatory variable but the expressed satisfaction with the received
share.11 In each round, after information about the received share is revealed, responders are asked
11 The satisfaction about the received share is highly correlated with the received share (model not shown). The
satisfaction about the received share, however, also depends on other variables, such as emotional elements
like anger or happiness, and the relative comparison with other group members when information on the
10
about their satisfaction level with their share (9 point scale with range [-4, 4]). We expect that lower
satisfaction is correlated with a higher likelihood for voting for punishment.
We also expect a treatment effect for voting being public or secret. When voting is public,
representatives know the voting behavior and may retaliate against ‘protesting’ responders when
making new distribution decisions in subsequent rounds. If responders anticipate such behavior, they
may be reluctant to vote in favor of punishment if voting is public. Clearly, there might be an
interaction effect with the responder’s satisfaction. Especially, more dissatisfied responders may care
less about the consequences of their voting decision on future earnings for at least two reasons. First,
negative emotional factors may outweigh earnings related considerations, and second, responders with
a low share have not much to lose anymore.
From public goods experiments it is well known that many people act as conditional cooperators
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006). Hence, if punishment is considered a public
good, responders may cast a vote in favor of punishment only if they expect the other responders to do
the same. To control for such a conditional voter effect, we add the responder’s likelihood estimates
that exactly one and exactly two other responders vote in favor of punishment. In addition, we control
for the information condition on the distribution decisions and the sex and the endowment of the
responder.
Table 2 shows the results of a probit regression where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if a
responder voted for punishment and zero otherwise. In all regressions, standard errors are corrected for
intra-group dependencies. The results show that the dissatisfaction with the received share exerts a
significant positive influence on a responder’s likelihood to vote in favor of punishment. As
hypothesized, when voting is public, responders are significantly more reluctant to vote in favor of
punishment; a tendency that is mitigated with lower satisfaction levels as indicated by the significant
interaction effect (Satisfaction x public voting).
 Responders are clearly conditional voters for punishment. The likelihood to vote in favor of
punishment increases significantly when responders believe that both other responders also vote for
punishment but is insignificant if they believe that only one other will do so. The insignificant
interaction terms between expectations and public voting show that this result does not differ between
private and public voting.
Interestingly, female responders have a much lower likelihood of voting in favor of punishment in
comparison with male responders. A similar effect exists for middle-endowment players. The
information on the distribution decision has a marginally significant effect; responders tend to vote for
distribution decisions is commonly known. For this reason, we include it as explanatory variable instead of
the received share.
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punishment with a higher likelihood if the distribution decision is commonly known.12 We summarize
our findings on the responders’ likelihood to vote in favor of punishment in a first result.
Table 2. Voting decision-making (probit)
Dependent variable: probability to vote in favor of punishment
Marg. prob. S.E.
Satisfaction with own share -0.097 0.017***
Public voting (dummy) -0.200 0.114*
Satisfaction x public voting -0.041 0.019**
Expectation 1 other vote 0.114 0.128
Expectation 2 other votes 0.441 0.135***
Public voting x expectation 1 other vote 0.221 0.158
Public voting x expectation 2 other votes -0.031 0.163
Female responder (dummy) -0.147 0.059**
Middle-endowment responder (dummy) -0.136 0.053**
Common information (dummy) 0.117 0.060*
Round 0.002 0.008
N 930
Pseudo R-squared 0.4083
Wald chi2(12) 254.90
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Observed probability 0.4527
Notes. Probit regression with robust standard errors to correct for intra-group dependencies. Significance levels (two-sided):
* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Result 1. Determinants of responders’ voting decisions
A responder’s propensity to vote in favor of punishment significantly increases with his
dissatisfaction about the received share. It also increases with the belief that both other responders
will vote in favor of punishment. When voting is secret or information on the distribution is common,
responders are less reluctant to vote in favor of punishment. Female and middle-endowment
responders have a significantly lower propensity to vote in favor of punishment.
12 More detailed investigation (models not shown) reveals that the gender and endowment differences are
mainly driven by differences in voting behavior when the information on the distribution decision is private.
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3.2. Representatives' distribution decision
Here we present the representatives’ distribution decision when the high-endowment player is the
representative, i.e. the first 10 rounds of the experiment. We start with some descriptive statistics on
the representatives’ distribution decisions followed by more detailed analysis.
Table 3 shows that on average representatives only give around 50% to the three responders in
total although their endowment is already 50% higher than the middle-endowment players’
endowments, and even 100% higher than the low-endowment players’ endowments. This suggests a
strong tendency towards earnings maximization and a considerable ineffectiveness of the punishment
by voting institution.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of distributive decisions
Mean share of . . .
Treatments:
High-endow
player
Middle-endow
 player 1
Middle-endow
 player 2
Low-endow
 player
Sec.vot./pr.info
106.88
(56.67) a
28.68
(27.00)
34.13
(26.06)
30.33
(25.06)
Pub.vot./pr.info
98.25
(46.88)
38.26
(21.66)
32.59
(25.21)
30.90
(28.76)
Sec.vot./com.info
102.33
(63.60)
29.64
(26.02)
35.81
(25.65)
32.21
(29.50)
Pub.vot./com.info
88.49
(61.43)
38.59
(25.67)
39.96
(23.97)
32.96
(27.09)
Total
98.88
(57.71)
33.93
(25.57)
35.62
(25.38)
31.58
(27.61)
a Standard deviation between parentheses. Group averages over all rounds.
Representatives who want to maximize earnings have not only to consider the share they keep for
themselves but also how to avoid punishment, as punishment costs are considerable. Table 4 shows
the average punishment frequency after pooling all rounds over all groups by treatment. It shows that
overall punishment is quite frequent and that there are considerable differences between treatments.
Independent of the information on the distribution decision punishment is more frequent when voting
is secret, and for any given voting condition, when information on the distribution is common.13 Using
group averages across all rounds as units of observation, differences are significant between public
voting/private information and secret voting/common information (Mann-Whitney U = 4.50; one-
13 Note that this is consistent with the regression results in the previous section on the responders’ propensity to
vote in favor of punishment.
13
sided p = .002). For all other pair-wise treatment comparisons, differences are not statistically
significant (one-sided p-values > .115).
Table 4. Average punishment frequency by treatment
Private
information
Common
information
Secret voting 42.50% 60.00%
Public voting 26.25% 42.25%
Based on the observation that punishment rates differ across treatments, we also expect that strategy
choices of the representatives differ across treatments, in particular, when comparing public
voting/private information and secret voting/common information.
To investigate this we classify the representatives’ strategies using the following two dimensions.
First, we take into account the share representatives keep for themselves. Since keeping more than 50
‘francs’ can hardly be considered as fair we distinguish between distributions where the representative
keeps more than 50 ‘francs’ from distributions where he keeps less or equal than 50 ‘francs’. Second,
when taking a distribution decision, representatives may consider the number of responders to exclude
from the resources, where exclusion means not giving any resources. Combining both considerations
gives eight possible classes of strategies. As Table 5 shows, two of these classes are empty and two
other very low percentages. We focus, therefore, on the following four classes of strategies.
‘Exclude-all’: This strategy consists of keeping the entire pie and, thus, excluding all responders
from the resources. This strategy is followed in 17.74% of the cases. ‘Exclude-one’: This strategy
consists of excluding exactly one responder and is with 32.90% of all cases the most commonly
chosen strategy. Note that excluding exactly one responder is in almost all of the cases combined with
the representative keeping shares higher than 50 ‘francs’. The ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy and
the ‘no-exclusion-high-share’-strategy have in common that they do not exclude any of the responders.
They differ in that in the former the representative keeps less (or equal) than 50 while in the latter he
keeps more than 50. ‘No-exclusion-low-share’ contains the case where the representative does not
keep any resources (3.23% of the cases) and the case where he distributes the resources equally among
all players (12.8% of the cases).14
Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies of each strategy in each treatment. Across treatments, there are
considerable differences in the use of the different strategies. In particular, with private information on
the distribution decision the ‘exclude-one’ strategy seems very popular whereas when it is combined
with public voting the ‘exclude-all’ strategy seems very unpopular.
14 It is worthwhile to note that a strategy of excluding two responders is almost never followed (0.65% of all
cases). From the perspective of the representative, this makes sense, because to avoid punishment a
representative needs at least two responders satisfied with their received share.
14
Table 5. Classification of strategies
Share of representative
? 50 > 50
0 26.13% 19.68%
1 2.90% 32.90%
2 0.00% 0.65%
Excluded responders
3 0.00% 17.74%
Note: N = 1240. Pooled over all rounds, groups and treatments
 A Mann-Whitney test, using the relative frequency of each strategy over all rounds for each group
as unit of observation, reveals that with private information the ‘exclude-all’ strategy is significantly
less often used with public voting than with secret voting (Mann-Whitney U = 18.50; one-sided p =
.080). It is also revealed that this strategy is significantly less often used in public voting/private
information than in secret voting/common information (Mann-Whitney U = 13.00; one-sided p =
.047). Here again the difference can be attributed to the voting condition. For the pooled data the
relative frequency of this strategy is significantly lower with public voting than with secret voting
(Mann-Whitney U = 77.00; one-sided p = .047) but not when comparing private information and
common information (Mann-Whitney U = 107.00; one-sided p = .273). For all other pair-wise
treatment comparisons, differences are not statistically significant (one-sided p-values > .150).
Figure 2. Representatives’ strategy choice by treatment
Note. All rounds and groups pooled.
The ‘exclude-one’-strategy is significantly more often used in public voting/private information than
in secret voting/common information (Mann-Whitney U = 11.50; one-sided p = .027) and in public
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voting/common information (Mann-Whitney U = 13.50; one-sided p = .025).15 These differences are
the result of the information regarding the distribution decision. Using the pooled data, if there is
common information on the representative’s decision ‘exclude-one’ is used significantly less often
than when this information is private (Mann-Whitney U = 70.00; one-sided p = .025). No such
difference is found when comparing secret and private voting (Mann-Whitney U = 102.00; one-sided
p = .248). Finally, the relative frequencies of the ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy and the ‘no-
exclusion-high-share’-strategy do not show any significant difference when compared between
treatments.
As there are middle-endowment and low-endowment responders, an important question relates to
which responders are more likely to be excluded when the representative follows the ‘exclude-one’-
strategy. To see this, we estimated a probit regression (with standard errors corrected for intra-group
dependencies) where we only consider observations with ‘exclude-one’-strategies and control for the
endowment of the responder. Pooling both secret voting treatments, the estimated coefficient is not
statistically significant from zero (one-sided p = .390; N = 126). With public voting, however, low-
endowment responders have a 40% higher probability to be excluded (one-sided p = .004; N = 180).
Note, that this result is perfectly consistent with our analysis on the voting decisions of the responders,
where we found that low-endowment responders have a higher propensity to vote in favor of
punishment than middle-endowment responders. With public voting, representatives obtain
information on individual voting decisions and are able to make inferences about the responders’
propensity to vote in favor of punishment. Observing that low-endowment responders have a higher
propensity to vote in favor of punishment, representatives may be more inclined to exclude low-
endowment responders than middle-endowment responders. The second result summarizes the
observations regarding the representative’s strategy choices.
Result 2. Representatives' strategy choices
With public voting the relative frequency of the ‘exclude-all’-strategy is significantly lower than with
secret voting. With private information on the distribution decision and public voting the relative
frequency of the ‘exclude-one’-strategy is highest. Moreover, when the representative follows the
‘exclude-one’ strategy, the low-endowment responder has a 40% higher probability of being
excluded if voting is public.
Up to now, we have ignored any potential dynamics in choices. Since a representative’s strategy
choice may change with punishment experience, we shall have a closer look to this dynamics.
Potentially important factors behind the dynamics of the representative’s strategy choice are his
15 No other pair-wise treatment comparisons show statistically significant differences (one-sided p-values >
.190).
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experiences and expectations about punishment. Being punished may change a representative’s
expectations and with it his strategy choice.
Table 6 shows for each treatment and strategy the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient
between the relative frequency of the strategy (pooled across all groups in a treatment) and the round
number. The figures in the first column show that the frequency of the ‘exclude-all’-strategy strongly
and significantly increases over in all but the public voting/private information treatment.
 In the secret voting/private information treatment, this increase is combined with a significant
decrease of the ‘exclude-one’-strategy. When information on the distribution is common, the increase
in the use of ‘exclude-all’ is at the expense of the ‘no-exclusion-high-share’-strategy.
Table 6. Correlations between use of strategies and time
Strategies
Treatments exclude-all exclude-one
no-exclusion
high-share
no-exclusion
low-share
% punishment
Sec.vot./pr.info
0.833
(.003)
-0.634
(.049)
-0.463
(.178)
0.439
(.205)
0.514
(.128)
Pub.vot./pr.info
-0.275
(.441)
0.303
(.396)
0.120
(.742)
-0.199
(.581)
-0.222
(.538)
Sec.vot./com.info
0.749
(.013)
0.342
(.334)
-0.619
(.056)
0.178
(.624)
-0.044
(.903)
Pub.vot./com.info
0.818
(.004)
0.199
(.582)
-0.824
(.003)
0.386
(.270)
0.161
(.657)
Notes. All groups pooled. Two-sided p-values between parentheses.
In those treatments where the frequency of the ‘exclude-all’-strategy increases with time, punishment
rates are also considerable (recall Table 4). One might expect that the increasing use of the ‘exclude-
all’-strategy leads to this high punishment frequencies. However, as confirmed by the insignificant
Spearman correlation coefficients in the last column of Table 6, punishment rates do not significantly
increase over time and, thus, have been high right from the start. This suggests that it is rather failure
in avoiding punishment that induces representatives to switch to the ‘exclude-all’-strategy. This is
confirmed by a probit regression estimating the likelihood that a representative changes his strategy
into the ‘exclude-all’-strategy after being punished in the previous round (only considering the rounds
where the strategy in the previous round was not the ‘exclude-all’ strategy). The estimation shows that
representatives have a 33% higher likelihood of changing their strategy into the ‘exclude-all’-strategy
if they were punished in the previous round than if they were not punished (two-sided p < .001; N =
222; robust standard errors correcting for intra-group dependencies).
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 There are two potentially contrary motivations that may trigger representatives to switch to the
‘exclude-all’ strategy. First, it my be mere revenge for being punished in the sense of a tit-for-tat
strategy, but second, it may also be because the representative expects higher earnings with an
‘exclude-all’ strategy, especially if other strategies do not avoid punishment. More generally, we can
look at the expected earnings for the different strategies. Recall that we asked the representative for
the likelihood that any specific responder votes in favor of punishment. With this information and the
actual distribution decisions, we can calculate the expected earnings for each strategy.
Figure 3. Expected earnings of the representative by strategy (rounds 1-10)
Notes. All rounds and treatments pooled. Two-sided p-values are calculated by estimating an OLS regression
with only a constant term and applying robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the expected earnings by strategy. We observe that when the
representative chooses the ‘exclude-all’-strategy, in more than 80% of the cases the expected earnings
are zero, implying that the representative expected to be punished. On the other hand, however, there
is a non-negligible fraction of cases where punishment is not expected and, hence, expected earnings
are rather high. In conclusion, the ‘exclude-all’ strategy is mainly used as a non-earnings maximizing
revenge option, but not exclusively so. The ‘exclude-one’ strategy completely excludes one responder
making it hardly justifiable on fairness grounds. At the same time, it produces the highest expected
earnings suggesting that this strategy is mainly used for earnings maximizing reasons. Responders
who play the ‘no-exclusion-high-share’ strategy also expect positive earnings. Only the ‘no-exclusion-
low-share’-strategy does not lead to positive expected earnings.
 The presented evidence suggests that on average representatives choose their strategies with an
earnings motive in mind. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the difference between representative’s
expected earnings in the current round and their earnings in the previous round and distinguishes
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between strategy choices that are different from those in the previous round and strategy choices that
are the same as in the previous round. It shows that when representatives do not change their strategy
they expect to obtain similar earnings as in the previous round. However, when they change their
strategy they clearly expect to receive significantly higher earnings than they obtained with the
strategy in the previous round. This gives support to the hypothesis that at least those representatives
who change their strategy do this for earnings reasons and take their expectations on the responders’
voting decisions into account.
Figure 4. Expected earnings round t  –  earnings round t-1 (rounds 1-10)
Notes. All rounds and treatments pooled. Two-sided p-values were calculated by estimating an OLS regression
with only a constant term and applying robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations
It is interesting to note, that in the public voting/private information treatment the ‘exclude-one’-
strategy makes up more than a  half  of  all  strategy choices.  In this  treatment  we also do not  see any
significant trend in strategy revisions (see Table 6), which is consistent with the low punishment rates
It seems that receiving information on the responders’ voting behavior enables representatives to infer
about the responders’ acceptance thresholds, which helps to avoid punishment, and to successfully
apply the ‘exclude-one’-strategy. We summarize the above discussion in a third result.
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Result 3. Strategy choice and strategy revision
Being punished induces representatives to switch to the ‘exclude-all’-strategy. Most representatives
seem to use it for revenge reasons because it mostly produces zero expected earnings. However,
most do not persist in using this strategy and switch to the strategies 'exclude-one' and 'no-
exclusion-high-share' which are expected to be more profitable.
In the public voting/private information treatment where punishment is relatively infrequent, many
representatives follow the ‘exclude-one’-strategy without exhibiting a significant trend to change
strategies.
3.3. Political change
In a last section, we briefly discuss the effect of a political change where the role of the representative
is taken from the high-endowment player and given to the low-endowment player, while keeping the
group composition constant.
Figures 5a and 5b show the mean final earnings (inclusive endowments and after deduction of
punishment costs) of each player type over all groups by treatment. They also show the distribution of
the endowments. Comparing the distribution of the final earnings with the distribution of the
endowment allows us to detect whether the distribution of the additional resources makes the final
distribution more equal. The results are mixed when the high-endowment player is the representative,
but the final distributions are clearly more equal than the distribution of the endowments when the
low-endowment player acts as representative.
To test whether the distributions of the final earnings in the second part are more equal than in the
first part, we calculate the standard deviations in final average earnings across players in each group
and  compare  them  between  the  first  and  the  second  part  of  the  experiment  for  each  treatment.  A
Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that the standard deviations are significantly different in the public
voting/private information treatment (Z = -2.380; two-sided p = .017) and the public voting/common
information treatment (Z = -2.380; two-sided p = .017), but not in any of the secret voting treatments
(Z > -1.540; two-sided p > .123).
In all treatments, in most of the cases, the low-endowment representative keeps a very
high share of the resources. In 99.68% of the decisions the representative keeps at least 50
‘francs’, in 73.87% even at least 100 ‘francs’ of the 200 ‘francs’. The low-endowment
representatives also make very frequent use of the ‘exclude-one’-strategy. In the treatments
with private information on the distribution, it is implemented in 82.5% and 72.5% of all
cases, when voting is secret and public, respectively. If the information about the distribution
decision is common these percentages are lower but still reach 50.0% and 58.8% when voting
is  secret  and  public,  respectively.  In  most  of  the  cases  where  this  strategy  is  used  it  is  the
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high-endowment player who is excluded. The frequencies are similar across treatments and
range from 47.5% in private information/secret voting to 52.5% in private information/public
voting. A relatively large proportion (30.0% over all treatments) of these exclusion-decisions
is the result of a 0-50-50-100 proposal, which equalizes the final earnings. Other strategies are
much less frequent. In only 9.68% of the decisions, exactly one of the middle-endowment
players is excluded and in only 6.77% of the decisions, the representative keeps everything.
Figure 5. Distribution of the final earnings by treatment
Note. Mean proportions are calculated over all rounds
Note. Mean proportions are calculated over all rounds
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Punishment rates vary between 20%-27% across treatments and are, hence, substantially and
significantly lower than when the high-endowment player is the representative (Wilcoxon signed ranks
test, Z = -3.038; two-sided p = .002). We attribute this to the fact that, in contrast with the high-
endowment player as representative, the earnings motive and fairness ideas are aligned making it more
acceptable to the responders that the low endowment player keeps more of the resources.
Thus, political change in favor of the poorest player is not only beneficial in distributional terms.
It also increases efficiency, measured as the sum of all incomes after punishment over the sum of all
incomes before punishment. As punishment costs are constant irrespective of the distribution, there is
a direct inverse relation between punishment rates and efficiency. Consequently, as punishment rates
are considerably lower when the low-endowment player becomes the permanent representative,
efficiency is considerably higher.
Result 4. Effects of political change
With the low-endowment player as the permanent representative, punishment rates are substantially
lower and, thus, efficiency substantially higher. In most of the cases, the representative keeps equal
or more than half of the pie. The ‘exclude-one’-strategy becomes more common and when it is
followed in most of the cases, it is the high-endowment player who is excluded. With public voting,
the final distribution of the net earnings becomes more equal.
4. Discussion and policy implications
In this study, we experimentally examine the influence of local information conditions on elite capture
and social exclusion in community-based development schemes. Not only information on the
distribution of aid resources through these schemes, but also information on who makes use of an
available punishment mechanism through majority voting may be important. In our laboratory
experiment, a permanent representative, being the richest of an economically heterogeneous group, is
asked to distribute a fixed amount of resources among the group members in subsequent rounds. After
each distribution decision, the other members have the ability to punish the representative, but only if
a majority of them votes in favor of doing so.
The main results are the following. First, many representatives try to satisfy a political majority
who would then abstain from using the punishment mechanism, while they exclude those community
members whose approval is then not required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with
private information on the distribution and public voting. Second, when voting is public, responders
are more reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism, and representatives exclude poorer
responders more often. Third, punishment is largely ineffective as, instead of enforcing representatives
to  reduce  their  share,  it  actually  induces  them to  try  to  capture all economic  resources.  Fourth,  if  a
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poor agent takes the representative’s role, punishment rates drop and final distributions become
substantially more equal.
Other results are that a responder’s likelihood of voting in favor of punishment increases with his
dissatisfaction with the received share. At the same time, responders take into account what they
expect other responders would do. In particular, there is strong evidence in favor of conditional voting
in the sense that a responder’s propensity to vote in favor of punishment strongly increases only if all
other responders are expected to do so as well.
Before discussing some policy implications of our study, an important methodological note is
required on the benefits of laboratory experiments for development economics. A big advantage of
conducting experiments in the laboratory is that it allows for gathering data that is otherwise hard to
get. For instance, for our purpose, it was important to receive information about people’s beliefs and
opinions and behavior in different controlled environments regarding the information people have
about distribution decisions and voting behavior. For robustness reasons it was also necessary that the
same situations could be replicated. All this is fairly impossible to achieve in the field but necessary if
one wants to get reliable data for different policy options. Potential caveats, however, exist regarding
the external validity of experiments conducted in laboratories. In particular, the behavior of the
population in the lab, mostly consisting of university students, may not be representative for the
population of interest. Regarding experiments exhibiting some proximity to our experiment the
evidence is mixed, however. For instance, Fehr and List (2004) report that CEO’s trust more and are
more trustworthy than students. List (2004) and, Egas and Riedl (2008), on the other hand, ?nd little
differences in social behavior between students and non-students, but both also report a positive
correlation between age and pro-social behavior. To make statements about external validity of
laboratory experiments, additional information can be included into the analysis. This can be done
through statistical tests (on this see Harisson and List, 2004: 1018-19), through sound field studies
(Ostrom, 1998: 17), or by comparing the results of experimental studies across different settings.
Following the latter approach, the field experiments of Henrich et al. (2004) are particularly
useful to make validity judgments about our setting. Henrich et al. conducted ultimatum game
experiments in 15 different small-scale societies in the South. An important result is that behavior in
these small-scale societies does not differ qualitatively, but it does so in a quantitative way. The
ultimatum game offers increase with two important characteristics of small-scale societies: the ‘Payoff
to Cooperation’ and a ‘Market Integration’ index. Comparing ultimatum game offers made by
northern students in computer laboratories with those made in small-scale societies in the South
(Cardenas  and  Carpenter,  2008),  it  can  be  observed  that  the  former  are  most  similar  to  small-scale
societies with considerable market integration. We are therefore confident that the results of our
laboratory experiment, which – as discussed before – shows some resemblance to the ultimatum game,
are particularly valid for these types of societies.
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With these caveats in mind, we highlight some policy implications for community-based
development suggested by our study. Assuming that policymakers have a certain margin to influence
institutions of information provision and political voice and control, our results indicate that they need
to choose between the lesser of two evils. With private information and public voting, punishment
rates are substantially lower and thus efficiency higher. At the same time, however, it is highly
probable that one responder (often the poorest) is excluded from all resources. Our evidence also
indicates that more important than these information conditions is the selection of the representative.
Making the poorest player the permanent representative not only makes the distribution of the final
earnings more equal, it also leads to less punishment and fewer wasted resources. Such a political
change is thus beneficial in both distributional and efficiency terms. This suggests that donors should
try to make such a political change feasible.
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Appendix 1: Experimental procedures and instructions
Experimental procedures
Several measures were taken to guarantee anonymity. To exclude the possibility that participants could make
inferences about the group to which they belonged each session was organized with at least two groups.
Moreover, participants were seated randomly in the computer lab with isolated cubicles. It was explained that
computer numbers were used to recognize participants during the experiment and the data analysis afterwards,
but could not be linked to the participants’ names. In addition, during the experiment no communication was
allowed, mobile phones were switched off and no participants could leave the lab. If participants had a question,
they were asked to raise their hand so that one of the experimenters could come and answer the question in
private.
After reading the instructions, the participants had to go through some control questions. The experiment
did not start before all participants had correctly answered these questions. At the end of the experiment,
participants were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. After all had completed this questionnaire, they were paid
out confidentially in cash.
Instructions
In this experiment, you can earn money. The experiment consists of three unrelated parts. That is, your earnings
in one part are independent from your earnings in other parts. In each part you can earn ‘francs’. The ‘francs’
you earn will be converted to Euro according to the conversion rate 200 francs = 1 Euro and paid out to you
privately and confidentially after the experiment.
During the whole experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants in any other
way than described in these instructions.
Instructions for part 1
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds.
Before the start :
You will be randomly assigned to a group of 4 participants. Group compositions do not change throughout the
10 rounds. The composition of your group is anonymous. Each group member receives randomly one of the
letters A, B, C or D as ‘ID’. Each letter corresponds to the same person during all 10 rounds.
During the experiment :
At the beginning of each round, you and all other members in your group receive a fixed amount of francs. This
is called your ‘endowment’. This endowment is not the same for everyone but depends on the letter ID. In each
round, member A receives 200 francs, members B and C receive 150 francs each, and member D receives 100
francs.
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In each round, participant A will also receive 200 additional francs at his/her free disposal. Of these additional
francs member A can keep as much as he/she wants for him/herself and give as much as he/she wants to each of
the other three participants in the group. We call member A a ‘type I’ participant, whereas we call the other
participants ‘type II’ participants.
 After  A  has  made  his/her  decision  about  the  distribution  of  the  additional  200  francs,  each  type  II
participant (members B, C, and D) will get to know his/her own received amount but not what the others
received or what A kept16.
 Thereafter, the type II participants (members B, C and D) have to vote whether or not to deduct francs from
A’s income. In this case, all type II members (also those who voted against deduction !) have to bear costs of 20
francs each. Voting is secret. This means that nobody will get to know anyone’s voting decision17.
 Before  taking  any  decision  in  a  specific  round,  you  can  review  all  information  you  received  in  all  past
rounds.
 After having made his/her decision each participant has to indicate his/her estimate about the voting
decisions of the other group members. These estimates are not transmitted to other participants but stay private
information. More particularly, type II and type I members have to do the following:
Type II members
After the individual voting decision but before knowing the outcome of the voting, each type II participant
(members B, C, and D) has to give his/her estimates about how many of the other two members will vote in
favor  of  deducting  200 francs  from A’s income.  This  works  as  follows:  Each type  II  member  has  to  indicate
what the likelihood is that precisely none, precisely one, or precisely two of the other type II members vote in
favor of deduction. These estimates have to be indicated in percentages, that is an integer number between 0 and
100 (inclusive). Note that the three numbers have to sum up to 100.
Type I member
After having made his/her decision but before knowing the outcome of the voting, the type I member (member
A) has to indicate his/her estimates about the voting decisions of each of the type II members (B, C, and D). For
each type II member (B, C, and D) he/she has to indicate his/her estimate about the likelihood that a particular
type II member votes in favor of or against deducting 200 francs from his/her income.
With the likelihood estimates you can earn additional francs. The amount you earn depends on the reported
likelihood estimates and the actual voting decisions of the other members. The earnings are calculated by means
of a mathematical formula. It is not important that you exactly understand this formula. Those interested in the
precise calculation of these additional earnings can find the formula on the sheet with the summary of the
instructions. It is sufficient that you realize that your expected earnings are maximized if you indicate your true
estimation of the likelihood. If your estimate is completely correct these earnings are 6 francs, if it is completely
wrong they are 0. With these likelihood estimates you can never incur losses.
16 With  common  information  this  phrase  was  replaced  by:  ‘After  A  has  made  his/her  decision,  each  type  II
participant (members B, C, and D) will get to know his/her own received amount, how much A kept, and the
amounts received by the other two members.’
17 With public voting, this phrase was replaced by: ‘Voting is public. This means that everybody will get to
know everyone’s voting decision.’
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Instructions for part 2
You  now  continue  during  an  additional  10  rounds.  Groups  remain  the  same,  so  you  remain  with  the  same
participants in your group.
A  round  in  this  part  is  precisely  the  same  as  before  except  that  now  member  D  has  become  the  type  I
participant and member A has become a type II participant. This means that now it is member D who receives
200 additional francs to his/her free disposal in each round. In addition, in each round participants A, B and C
will be given the opportunity to vote in favor of deducting francs from the income of participant D.
Appendix 2: An outcome-based fairness model
In this appendix, we present equilibria of our game using a Fehr-Schmidt utility function (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). This utility function allows for self-centered fairness and has been shown to lead to more realistic
predictions in diverse settings. Preferences are represented by a utility function for player i (= 1, … , n) of the
following form:
( ) { } { }åå ------ j jiiijjiii
,yy
n
?,yy
n
?y=yU 0max
1
10max
1
1 ,
with ii ?,?  being respectively the envy and guilt parameters of player i, which determine the utility loss due to
disadvantageous and advantageous inequality aversion respectively. It is assumed that ii ?? £  and 10 <?i£ .
Applying this utility function to our experimental game, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 1
- Strategy combinations ( )yy,y,  and ( )nn,n, , which are equilibria under standard preferences, are still an
equilibrium with Fehr-Schmidt preferences.
- Assuming that envy and guilt parameters are the same for all responders18, strategy combinations with exactly
one responder voting in favor of punishment (which lead to non-punishment), which are an equilibrium with
standard preferences, are no longer an equilibrium with Fehr-Schmidt preferences if:
1. for at least two responders i = B, C and D: Ai yy £  and Kyky Ai -£- ; kK
k
?
-
³ 3
2. for exactly one responder i = B, C and D: Ai yy £  and Kyky Ai -£-
i)
kK
k
?
-
³ 3 ; for at least one of both other responders: ( Ai yy £  and Kyky Ai -³- ) and ( ?yy Ai -£ ), with
[ ]
( )?+?
kK?+=? -3k
ii)
kK
k<?
-
3 ; for both other responders: ( Ai yy £  and Kyky Ai -³- )  and  ( ?yy Ai -£ ), with
[ ]
( )?+?
kK?+=? -3k
18 This is a realistic assumption as the representative cannot make any inference about these parameters before
having interacted with the responders, and thus does not have any reason to assume that these differ between
the responders
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3.  for  at  least  two  responders  i  =  B,  C  and  D:  ( Ai yy £  and Kyky Ai -³- ) and ( ?yy Ai -£ ), with
[ ]
( )?+?
kK?+=? -3k
Proof
Strategy combinations with exactly one responder voting in favor of punishment (which thus lead to non-
punishment) are not an equilibrium if at least two responders are better-off when the representative is punished
(and thus the representative is punished).
We assume that iE  is the endowment that player i receives before the distribution of the additional
resources M. ix  is  the  share  of  the  additional  resources  M  player  i  obtains  and iii x+E=y .  Suppose  that  the
representative A proposes the distribution ( )DCBA x,x,x,x , with M=x+x+x+x DCBA , and ( )DC,B,A,=iM,xi ££0 .
We now look at the conditions that make a responder’s utility higher with punishment than without punishment.
The utility of responder B without punishment would then be19:
{ } { } { }[ ]0max0max0max
3
1 ,yy+,yy+,yy?y=U BDBCBAB
P0
B ----
{ } { } { }[ ]0max0max0max
3
1 ,yy+,yy+,yy? DBCBAB ----
The utility of responder B with punishment would be:
ky=U B
P1
B - { } { } { }[ ]0max0max0max3
1 k,+yky+k,+yky+k,+yKy? BDBCBA -------
{ } { } { }[ ]0max0max0max
3
1 k,+yky+k,+yky+K,+yky? DBCBAB -------
We have the following possible situations20:
(a) AB yy £  and Kyky AB -£-
(b) AB yy £  and Kyky AB -³-
(c) AB yy ³  and Kyky AB -³-
(d) AB yy ³  and Kyky AB -£-
Case (a) P0BP1B UU ³  if [ ] [ ]BABA yy?yk+y+K?k --³---- 3
1
3
1
[ ] 0
3
1
³---Û k+K?k
kK
k
?
-
³Û 3
Case (b) P0BP1B UU ³ if [ ] [ ]BAAB yy?yK+y+k?k --³---- 3
1
3
1
19 We elaborate here the case, where people include their endowment CBA E,E,E  or DE  in their utility function.
However, it might also be that players only take account of the amount to be distributed and not of the final
pay-offs. In such a case, the endowment terms have to be removed from all expressions.
20 Note that a responder’s preference for punishment does not depend on the inequality vis-à-vis the other
responders, as punishment costs are the same for all responders, and consequently punishment does not have
any impact on the inequality between responders. The responder’s utility depends on whether she faces
advantageous or disadvantageous inequality towards the representative before and after punishment. This
implies that the conditions as elaborated for responder B equally apply for responders C and D, who might
have different endowments.
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[ ] [ ]BAAB yy?yK+y+k? --³----Û 3k
[ ] [ ] [ ] 03k £----Û BAAB yy?yy?+K+k?+
[ ] [ ] [ ]K+k?yy?+yy? ABAB ---£--Û 3k
( ) ( ) [ ]K+k?yy?+? AB ---£-×Û 3k
?yy AB -£Û with
[ ]
( )?+?
kK?+=? -3k
Case (c) P0BP1B UU ³ if [ ] [ ]ABAB yy?yK+y+k?k --³---- 3
1
3
1
[ ] kkK? -£-Û
3
1
this condition is infeasible as 0>k>K and 0³? ; in this case the utility with punishment will always be lower
than the utility without punishment.
Case (d) this is infeasible because K<k
Taking together cases (a), (b), (c) and (d) we come to the conditions as described in this proposition that make
that at least two responders are better off when the representative is punished (and thus the representative is
punished).
Lemma 1
If the representative believes that he cannot influence the punishment outcome with his distribution decision, his
optimal distribution decision will be:
1. keep all resources if
4
3<?A
2. distribute the resources so that the final income of all players is equalized, if
4
3>?A
Proof
We will show the case where the representative is punished. The non-punishment case is similar as marginal
utilities of changing the shares of the players are the same without punishment (K and k are not dependent on the
shares of the players).
The utility of the representative with punishment would be:
Ky=U A
P1
A - { } { } { }[ ]0max0max0max3
1 K,+kyy+K,+kyy+K,+kyy? ADACABA -------
{ } { } { }[ ]0max0max0max
3
1 K,k+yy+K,k+yy+K,k+yy? DACABAA -------
If the representative cannot influence the punishment outcome, the game reduces to a dictator game. As
AA ?? £  and 10 <?A£ , all responders will receive an equal or lower share than the representative after
punishment
[ ]DCBAAAP1A yyy+?Ky=U ------ 3K3k3y3
1
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1. If
4
3<?A  the representative will maximize his/her income by excluding all responders from the resources.
Consequently, [ ]3k3K3M3
3
1 +EEE+E?KE+M=U DCBAAA
P1
A ------
2. If
4
3>?A  the representative will maximize the income of the responders.
Therefore, ( )KE+E+E+E+M=ky=ky=ky=Ky DCBADCBA ------ 3k4
1 ,
and, ( )KE+E+E+E+M=U DCBAP1A -- 3k4
1
Proposition 2
If the representative believes that the punishment outcome depends on his distribution decision, the
representative’s optimal strategy is:
1. If
4
3>?A , the representative equalizes the final income of all players.
2. If
4
3<?A , the ‘exclude-all’-strategy is optimal if this strategy and any alternative strategy lead to the same
punishment outcome. The ‘exclude-all’-strategy is not optimal and instead the ‘exclude-one’-strategy is
preferred, if the ‘exclude-all’-strategy implies punishment whereas the ‘exclude-one’-strategy does not and
( ) [ ]kK?K<xM? AAA ---÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -
3
41 , with M<xA , Ax  being the representative’s share under the ‘exclude-one’-
strategy.
Proof
1.
4
3>?A :
According to lemma 1 the representative will equalize the final income of all players if he/she believes that the
punishment outcome is independent from his/her distribution decision. If he/she believes that the punishment
outcome is dependent on his/her distribution decision, this strategy would still be optimal, as it leads to non-
punishment. Equalizing the final income of all players makes each responder preferring that the representative is
not punished.
2.
4
3<?A :
According to lemma 1 the representative will keep as much as possible to him/herself if he/she believes that the
punishment outcome is independent from the distribution. Whether this strategy is still optimal if he/she believes
that the punishment outcome is dependent from the distribution, depends on the punishment outcome of this
strategy and any alternative strategy. For any other strategy to be preferred to the ‘exclude-all’-strategy it must
be that only the latter strategy implies punishment. We elaborate this for the ‘exclude-one’-strategy:
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KM+E=all)(ExcludeU AA -- [ ]Kk+EM+E+Kk+EM+E+Kk+EM+E? DACABAA ------- 3
1
AA y=one)(ExcludeU - [ ]DACABAA yy+yy+Ey? ---- 3
1 ; assume he/she excludes responder B
The exclude-one strategy is preferred above the exclude-all strategy if and only if:
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41 , with M<x A
Note that, if
4
3
³A?  this condition always holds as k>K
